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Developing countries can grow rapidly by absorbing known technologies from more 
advanced countries. Yet developing countries often find it difficult to absorb 
relatively simple technologies even when they have the resources to buy the relevant 
machines and have workers with the appropriate levels of formal education who are 
willing to work for relatively low wages. The reasons are often contracting problems 
that prevent critical investments being organized. A number of potentially relevant 
contracting failures are well known but a particularly important one is 
underemphasized. Developing countries typically lack the organizational and 
technological capabilities embedded in firms that are necessary for using new 
technologies to produce competitive products. Building organizations that can 
competitively use the new technologies is a difficult task that is subject to significant 
contracting failures. Developing the appropriate organizational capabilities involves 
the exertion of significant effort in the acquisition of tacit knowledge, a process that is 
difficult to observe and control. This exposes financiers to significant contracting 
risks that can result in non-investment or the failure to achieve competitiveness. In 
general, solutions to contracting failures require properly designed corrective policies 
and appropriate governance capabilities on the part of the state. Developing countries 
typically have limited governance capabilities and limited potential of developing 
these capabilities in every direction. It is therefore important to identify the precise 
contracting failures that are most important to address and to design policies that have 
the greatest chance of being implemented given existing governance capabilities and 
the feasible improvements in these capabilities. The fit between problems, policies 
and capabilities can explain why some countries or sectors can do well even when 
overall governance capabilities are weak.  
 
Technology policies (often also described as industrial policies) describe a range of 
policies that could in principle address a wide variety of contracting failures using 
instruments that assist the parties involved to move closer to desirable outcomes. 
However, the problem is that while private contracting in developing countries is 
subject to many contracting failures, their states also lack many of the critical 
enforcement and governance capabilities required to effectively implement many 
corrective policies. The general observation is that developing countries have weak or 
imperfect governance, and this often leads to the policy advice that they should steer 
clear of industrial policies. This avoids the problem of government failures but it 
obviously does not make the underlying market failures disappear. However, the 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, email: mk100@soas.ac.uk, web: 
http://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff31246.php. I would like to thank Pranab Bardhan and Joe Stiglitz for 
comments on an earlier version of the paper.  
2 
 
historical evidence makes it painfully obvious that given imperfect governance, not all 
technology policies are likely to achieve the desired results. To be effective, 
technology policies have to be designed to be effective given the institutions and 
governance capabilities of particular states. This implies that the relevant contracting 
failures have to be properly identified to determine the problems policies have to 
address. Secondly, there are usually many possible responses to any particular 
contracting problem, and not all of them may be equally enforceable in every context. 
The second step is therefore to select the response that is most likely to be effective 
given the relative power of the interests affected by the policy in the local context. 
Finally, for policies to be successful, some governance capabilities may also need to 
be developed in critical agencies to monitor and enforce particular policies.  
 
Understanding the interrelationships between these factors can help to explain why 
some countries have done rather better with industrial policies than others in contexts 
of weak governance. While all developing countries are far removed from the 
textbook requirements of ‘good governance’ (strong enforcement of a rule of law, 
government accountability and well-defined property rights), some have been better 
or luckier in adopting policies that were more effective in the context of their 
governance, and better at developing the capabilities of critical agencies that enabled 
these strategies to be effectively implemented. These insights can help us to design 
better technology policies in countries that have performed less well. Although the 
policy solutions for addressing many technology-adoption problems can appear to be 
quite similar (for instance providing temporary subsidies to firms), the governance 
conditions for ensuring their success can be quite different depending on the 
underlying contractual problem that the subsidy aims to resolve and the specific 
policy solutions adopted in response.  
 
The literature on technology and industrial policies identifies a number of different 
contracting problems affecting technology adoption. It is likely that a country faces 
more than one problem at any one time. However, policy needs to ensure that the 
most general problems (the ones that affect all or most cases of technology 
acquisition) are addressed first. Unfortunately, the most general problem is not 
necessarily the easiest to solve in terms of appropriate policy design and the requisite 
governance capabilities. At the heart of the technology acquisition problem is the 
paradox that low-wage countries are unable to achieve competitiveness using freely-
available technologies that they should in principle be able to use. The reason for this 
is that competitiveness depends not just on wages but also on the productivities of 
labour, input usage and capital equipment. The productivity of all factors depends not 
just on the formal technical knowledge of workers and managers but also and 
primarily on the tacit knowledge of organizational and technological capabilities that 
is embedded in the routines of the production team as a whole.  
 
The technological capabilities of workers and managers refer to their abilities to use 
machines and technologies properly. These capabilities are partly based on formal 
education and training but can also depend on on-the-job learning-by-doing. In 
addition, the productivity of workers, the productivity of input usage and that of 
capital equipment depends on the organization as a whole working effectively as a 
team. This is why organizational capabilities are possibly even more important for 
the overall productivity and competitiveness of the firm. Organizational capabilities 
are embedded in the routines of the organization, and these organizational structures 
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are a form of tacit knowledge that the organization acquires, again often through 
learning-by-doing and experimentation. Without these technological and 
organizational capabilities, productivity levels are typically too low for the developing 
country to competitively engage in production, even if it acquires the machines and 
has workers and managers who have the formal knowledge that is required for the use 
of the technology. This is true even for relatively low technology production 
processes. The acquisition of tacit knowledge through learning-by-doing is one of the 
most general problems affecting almost all areas of technology acquisition in 
developing countries and is subject to important contracting failures. In the absence of 
solutions to these problems, a new firm or an entire country can find its technology 
acquisition strategies blocked. 
 
It is widely recognized that the acquisition of tacit knowledge requires learning-by-
doing. However, the problem is that ‘doing’ without a large element of effort is not 
likely to generate much learning. Effort is obviously important in the learning-by-
doing processes through which individual workers improve their productivity. But 
effort is particularly important in developing organizational capabilities because the 
learning that is involved here involves the organization and reorganization of firms as 
complex organizations that can work smoothly to produce competitive products. 
When infant industries fail to graduate into productive enterprises despite decades of 
‘doing’ financed by different types of implicit subsidies, it is almost always because 
there was a failure of organizational learning. The continuous restructuring and fine-
tuning of organizations to achieve high levels of productivity and competitiveness is a 
high effort activity that involves risks and costs for managers and other stakeholders. 
Change is painful and has distributive implications that are likely to be resisted. 
Without pressure and even compulsion, doing can continue indefinitely without any 
organizational learning happening.  
 
The obvious conclusion is that successful learning requires the exertion of a high level 
of effort in the learning process, particularly by management. The effort here refers to 
the effort in experimenting with and achieving the organizational design and work 
practices that achieve the required levels of productivity. Effort here does not refer to 
the effort exerted in the normal production process. The problem is that the 
appropriate incentives and compulsions for ensuring high levels of learning effort are 
difficult to enforce. This is the contracting failure that constrains private money 
flooding in to finance investments in learning-by-doing. But public financing is also 
likely to be largely wasted if it does not address the underlying contracting problem in 
ways that can be effectively enforced. This is likely to be the most general contracting 
problem affecting technology adoption. Even when developing countries succeed in 
acquiring and installing production facilities using technologies that are theoretically 
appropriate, they often find their levels of productivity are too low to achieve 
competitiveness. Missing tacit knowledge about how to organize the relevant 
production processes is usually at the heart of the problem. If the problems 
constraining the acquisition of technological and organizational capabilities are not 
solved, solutions to other aspects of the technology adoption problem are not likely to 
be effective. 
 
Financing learning-by-doing strategies effectively requires appropriate governance 
capabilities on the part of the state. Discussions about the governance conditions 
required for effective technology policies used to be dominated by the experiences of 
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East Asian countries, and particularly South Korea. In South Korea, high levels of 
effort in the learning supported by its industrial policy in the decades after the 1960s 
were ensured by credible state sanctions on non-performing enterprises. This required 
bureaucratic capabilities to monitor performance and withdraw support from non-
performers and it also required a business sector that could not make political 
alliances to protect their temporary ‘learning rents’ (Khan 2000b). This combination 
of bureaucratic and political conditions is typically lacking in most developing 
countries. If the South Korean instruments for financing learning were the only ones 
available, we would have to reach the conclusion that technology policies were not 
feasible in most developing countries. However, the experience of successful sectors 
in developing countries with relatively weak governance capabilities shows that other 
types of financing can be effective in apparently adverse governance conditions. The 
critical requirement is that institutional and political conditions have to be appropriate 
for creating credible incentives and compulsions for high levels of effort during the 
learning process given specific financing instruments. This is illustrated with 
reference to examples of successful learning-by-doing and technology adoption in 
India and Bangladesh. The policy conclusion is that technology policy is possible in 
countries with ‘imperfect’ governance conditions, but only if the financing 
instruments and sectors supported are compatible with the institutional and political 
conditions in the country.  
 
Section 1 sets out a simple model showing how effort in learning determines the 
likelihood of acquiring the tacit knowledge embedded in organizations that achieve 
high levels of productivity and competitiveness. For investments in learning to 
achieve these results, a set of specific contracting failures have to be solved. Attempts 
to solve other contracting failures that can also plausibly constrain technology 
acquisition are unlikely to be effective without solutions to this fundamental problem. 
Section 2 discusses the variables that affect the likelihood of high levels of effort in 
the learning process. This part of the analysis draws on the concept of the political 
settlement that describes an equilibrium distribution of power between organizations 
of different types (Khan 2010, 2012). Section 3 summarizes two cases of successful 
catching up from India and Bangladesh to demonstrate the general argument. The 
conclusion summarizes the policy messages implied by the analysis. 
 
1. Tacit knowledge, Organizational Capabilities and Competitiveness  
Developing countries trying to absorb new technologies are attempting to produce 
products that already have a global price for different qualities set by the leading 
countries using these technologies. The machines and technologies for producing 
these products are likely to be well known but there may be many variants of 
competitive organizations using these technologies in different leading countries. 
These organizational variants reflect differences in local conditions, habits of work of 
the workforce, infrastructural constraints that have to be dealt with and so on, but in 
every case, the existing organizations define levels of quality and price that the 
catching-up country has to match. Protecting domestic markets, granting export 
subsidies or implicit subsidies of different types can provide infant industries in 
developing countries with the ‘loss-financing’ to engage in production and learning-
by-doing, but unless competitiveness catches up, these strategies become 
unsustainable in terms of the accumulating subsidy cost.  
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Competitiveness depends on both price and quality. For a catching-up firm to 
graduate out of subsidies, it has to achieve a price-quality mix that is globally 
competitive. Once this is achieved, explicit or implicit subsidies are no longer 
required. Products can be defined as combinations of characteristics. Broad clusters of 
characteristics define a particular type of product, but any product also has detailed 
characteristics of reliability, performance, attractiveness, design and a range of other 
functions that can distinguish the ‘quality’ of particular products within a broad group 
(Lancaster 1966; Sutton 2005, 2007). Products can therefore be indexed by quality, 
with higher quality cars (for instance) being (in general) more difficult and more 
expensive to produce, but also attracting a higher price that is high enough to make it 
worthwhile for producers to always seek to improve product quality.  
 
Developing countries are generally not in the business of innovating new products. 
This is a relatively small part of the growth process even in middle income developing 
countries. Rather, the most important problem for developing countries is to learn 
how to produce an improving range of products from the qualities that already exist, 
at a price that is equal to or lower than the ones already available. If a country can 
produce an existing product of a particular quality at a price lower than that currently 
prevailing it has a chance of capturing markets from already established producers or 
extending the market to new consumers. Lower quality products are generally easier 
to produce, but for any quality level a maximum price is defined in global markets 
and a new entrant will not be able to sell its products without a subsidy if it cannot 
match this price. The problem for developing countries is that they are often unable to 
produce products of the requisite price-quality combination even when their wages 
are lower than their competitors and even when they aim at relatively low qualities 
and technologies.  
 
Higher quality products have, by definition, a higher selling price, so in general they 
allow either a higher wage or a higher profit mark-up or both. Improving the quality 
of products is therefore a way of achieving wage and profit growth. Secondly, 
productivity growth is likely to be higher in higher quality products to the extent that 
these are still the subject of innovation in advanced countries. Developing countries 
that shift to higher qualities and build the organizations that can effectively produce 
these qualities are therefore likely to enjoy faster incremental productivity growth by 
being able to copy or adapt these innovations. At the same time, lower quality 
products can become inferior goods as world incomes increase, and global consumers 
are likely to gradually shift away from goods of lower quality. Finally, lower quality 
products are more likely to be targeted as entry points by even poorer countries 
creating gradual downward pressure on prices. It is therefore both socially and 
privately desirable to produce the highest quality products that are feasible. 
 
The catching up problem can therefore be defined as a) entering globally competitive 
production for a variety of products at the highest feasible levels of quality, b) 
spreading these organizational capabilities broadly to create jobs across the working 
population and c) systematically moving up the quality ladder across product 
categories to achieve wage growth and sustained productivity growth. In reality, many 
developing countries struggle to produce anything competitively. Some produce a 
very limited range of competitive products but of low quality and find it difficult to 
move up the product and quality ladder. A few more advanced developing countries 
produce a range of competitive products, some of higher quality, but face challenges 
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in achieving quality improvements and even greater challenges in entering new 
product ranges.  
 
The essential features of the catching-up problem can be described using a simple 
mark-up pricing model for products of a given quality. The current global price of a 
particular product of quality Q is set by its cost of production in the country that is 
currently the global production leader. The unit price can be arithmetically broken 
down into the unit labour cost plus the unit input cost plus the unit amortized capital 
cost representing the unit cost of machinery and buildings. This is shown in eq. [1]:  
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To simplify the notation we do not denote products and simply refer to a particular 
quality indexed by Q, so Q+1 represents a higher quality product compared to Q. 
global
QP  is the international price of a particular product of quality Q. 
leader
QW is the wage 
level in the leading country producing the product of quality Q. leaderQΠ is the 
productivity of labour in this activity in the leading country, measured by the output 
per person in this activity. The first term on the right hand side is therefore the unit 
labour cost.  
 
The second term is the unit input cost. The production of the product requires i inputs 
as raw materials or semi-manufactured inputs. To simplify, we assume these inputs 
are globally traded, each with a global price of PQi. The efficiency with which inputs 
are used is measured by the productivity of input use (output per unit input). In the 
leading country, the input productivities of each of the i inputs are represented by 
𝛼𝑄𝑖
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. Input productivity primarily measures wastage and input loss due to rejected 
final products. In many production processes this is a critical determinant of 
competitiveness. 
 
The third term refers to the unit ‘capital’ cost attributable to the cost of machinery and 
buildings. There are k inputs of this type, and the most important elements are usually 
machines, which have a globally traded price, though land and buildings can also be 
significant cost components in some cases. The unit cost of capital is determined by 
the fraction of each component of these capital costs attributed to the particular period 
of production, represented by PQk divided by the output-capital ratio for each type of 
capital (the productivity of capital) measured by 𝛽𝑄𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. As the capital stock that is 
available in each period is fixed, the output-capital ratio depends critically on the 
scale of production that determines capacity utilization. The higher the output 
achieved with any given capital stock, the higher the productivity of capital measured 
by each 𝛽𝑄𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. Low capital productivity could therefore be the result of a lack of 
technological capabilities on the part of the workforce resulting in improper use of 
machinery but it could also reflect spare capacity if machines and fixed assets are 
underused because of a suboptimal scale of production. Finally, the mark-up 
determining price is set at mQ.  
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In the same way, the cost of production (in a common currency) in the developing 
country is the domestic cost domesticQC for the product of quality Q, given by an exactly 
equivalent equation but with the appropriate domestic productivities and prices: 
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The follower country achieves competitiveness when its domesticQC ≤
global
QP . The 
globally traded prices of inputs and machinery are typically similar in the follower 
and leader countries but wages and some input costs are likely to be lower in the 
former. The cost of borrowing, which affects the amortized cost of capital, may be 
higher in the follower (reflecting a higher risk premium), but the difference may not 
be very significant. It may therefore appear that the developing country should be able 
to achieve competitiveness for many simple technologies for which the appropriate 
formal skills exist since its wage level is lower: leaderQ
domestic
Q WW < , and most other 
prices are either similar (globally tradable inputs and machinery) or  lower (possibly 
for some non-tradable inputs like land and buildings). But in fact developing countries 
usually cannot break into the production even of relatively low technology (low 
quality) products because they typically suffer from significant productivity 
disadvantages that more than negate their wage and other cost advantages. Output per 
person is generally much lower, Π𝑄𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 < Π𝑄𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟, as are many input and capital 
productivities, 𝛼𝑄𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 < 𝛼𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 and 𝛽𝑄𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 < 𝛽𝑄𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟. These productivity 
differentials explain why despite low wages, the follower country typically has a 
higher cost of production than the global price even for relatively low technology 
products.  
 
It may appear that a low wages could compensate for these productivity differentials, 
but in reality that wage may have to be much lower than is feasible. A more profound 
problem is that in many cases, even zero wages may not be able to compensate for a 
lower efficiency of input and capital productivity. This is because inputs and capital 
equipment have global prices that have to be paid. If  𝛼𝑄𝑖𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 < 𝛼𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 for 
expensive globally traded inputs, the greater wastage of inputs alone could result in a 
higher domestic cost of production even if the domestic unit labour cost could be 
pushed to zero. This is why efficiency in controlling the wastage of inputs and 
reducing product rejection is often a critical variable in achieving competitiveness. In 
addition, the productivity of critical capital equipment is often lower, with 𝛽𝑄𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 < 
𝛽𝑄𝑘
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 as a result of machinery not being properly set up, or the optimal scale of 
production not being achieved. Indeed, a small disadvantage in these productivity 
variables across a number of inputs and types of capital could mean that even with 
zero wages, the cost of production in the developing country may be higher. In fact, 
wages are typically a relatively small part of the cost of production even in labour-
intensive manufacturing processes. Competitiveness, even in low technology 
products, therefore depends more on the level and growth of productivity rather than 
on cost advantages.  
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While it is conceptually useful to distinguish between labour, input and capital 
productivity, all of these productivity measures are affected by the ways in which 
production is set up and organized by the management and workers operating 
machinery of a specific type. The productivity of all inputs including labour depends 
on how effectively the production process is organized. Output per person, QΠ , 
depends on a variety of economy-wide and firm-level factors. The economy-wide 
determinants of firm labour productivity include the quality of public goods and 
utilities including the quality of education, infrastructure and the reliability of utility 
supplies. Firm labour productivity is also determined by firm-level variables like the 
capital equipment used by labour and the skill and experience of the workforce and 
management. The technological capabilities of workers are important determinants of 
firm-level productivity. These depend on their formal training and education but also 
on their tacit knowledge of operating equipment effectively as a result of learning-by-
doing. However, an even more important determinant of firm-level labour 
productivity is the organization of the firm: how teams are set up to ensure a smooth 
flow of production, how machinery is set up to reduce bottlenecks, how management 
systems are set up to solve problems and so on. These organizational capabilities are 
also the result of effective learning-by-doing that results in the evolution of a work 
organization that achieves high labour productivity.  
 
In the same way, the efficiency of input use, Qiα  depends on the same economy-level 
variables determining the skills and education of the workforce, as well as firm-level 
variables like the type and sophistication of the capital equipment used and the 
technological skills of the workforce using this equipment, based on both formal skills 
and tacit knowledge. In addition, the firm-level organization of production is again 
often of critical significance. Organizational design is critical for limiting the wastage 
of raw materials and for maintaining quality so that final products are not rejected, 
thereby maintaining input productivity at a high level. Finally capital productivity also 
varies significantly across countries and firms even for machinery of exactly the same 
type. This too reflects differences in the organization of production and the skills and 
capabilities of the workers and managers. However, in addition capital productivity is 
also a function of the scale of production. For firms entering new lines of production, 
the scale of production can be constrained by the low competitiveness of the firm. 
This is because as long as a firm suffers from low labour and input productivity, it can 
only sell its products at a lower profit margin or at a loss. This can prevent it from 
expanding the scale of production, and the low capital productivity that results can 
further damage its competitiveness.   
 
Thus, competitiveness and the underlying productivities that determine 
competitiveness are not just determined by having the right machinery for producing 
products of a particular quality and having workers and managers with the right levels 
of formal education and training. It depends more critically on the technological and 
organizational capabilities of the teams using the machines to produce products, and 
both sets of capabilities depend on the successful outcomes of difficult learning-by-
doing processes. Early development theory and practice emphasized investment in 
modern machinery but we now know this is not sufficient without strategies for 
achieving competitiveness. Crippling differences in productivity persist across 
countries using identical machinery (Clark and Wolcott 2002; Sutton 2007). While the 
economy-level constraints on productivity are widely recognized, the firm-level 
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technological and organizational capabilities of workers and management are 
probably much more important in explaining why some countries take off when they 
do. Takeoffs are rarely triggered by prior improvements in economy-wide 
infrastructural conditions, though sustaining growth clearly requires an improving 
efficiency in the delivery of education and infrastructure.  
 
The importance of firm-level organizational capabilities as the critical determinant of 
competitiveness is based on two interrelated observations. First, there is the 
observation from observers of technological capabilities that much of the 
technological and organizational knowledge necessary for competitiveness is tacit 
knowledge embedded in routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi 1988; Pelikan 1988; 
Perez and Soete 1988). Engaging in effective productive activity requires a mix of 
formal or codifiable knowledge (knowledge that can be communicated in words or 
symbols) and uncodifiable ‘knowing-how-to’ knowledge that is embedded in 
unconscious and often complex routines. The latter is defined as tacit knowledge and 
the significance of its non-codified form is that acquiring this knowledge requires 
learning-by-doing rather than attending formal courses (Polanyi 1967). The process of 
learning efficient routines inevitably involves practice and the adaptation of practice 
to local conditions rather than reading off blueprints from a manual. Compared to the 
difficulty of ‘acquiring’ this tacit knowledge, buying the machines and setting up the 
factory are often much the easier parts of the process of technology acquisition and 
growth.  
 
The difference between technological and organizational capabilities is often difficult 
to distinguish in practice because the former can depend on the latter. Technological 
capabilities refer to the productivity of individual workers which can depend on their 
tacit knowledge of how to use particular machines effectively. Organizational 
capabilities refer to the design of the organization that determines the productivity of 
each individual worker, and this also determines input and capital productivity. The 
organization of production refers to things such as setting up the layout of the 
machines so that production bottlenecks are avoided given the pace of work that can 
be achieved with local conditions, implementing effective quality control routines 
with incentives that are appropriate for local conditions, managing inventories taking 
into account local infrastructural constraints, meeting orders on time and so on.  
 
The importance of the organizational capabilities of a production team as a whole 
becomes obvious when workers migrate from developing countries to more advanced 
ones. Their individual productivity jumps when they join a modern organization. In 
migrating to join an already efficient organization, an individual worker rapidly slots 
into existing routines and thereby rapidly improves their individual productivity, even 
in terms of the learning-by-doing that improves their individual technological 
capabilities. In contrast, if the whole team is operating with the routines of an 
inefficient organization or still experimenting with new routines, the individual 
productivity of each worker is likely to remain low. Evolving these routines takes 
effort from all the stakeholders as it involves experimentation and re-allocation of 
duties and responsibilities till the organization as a whole achieves competitiveness. 
Even relatively low-technology production of relatively low quality products like 
garments requires acquiring a huge amount of tacit organizational knowledge 
embedded in the routines of interaction between the hundreds or even thousands of 
workers and managers in the organization.  
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Secondly, the literature on technological and organizational capability also points out 
that tacit knowledge is largely acquired through processes of learning-by-doing (Lall 
1992, 2000a, 2000b, 2003). If a firm has to engage in learning-by-doing to achieve 
competitiveness, the implication is that it has to begin production before it achieves 
competitiveness. This is very significant. Investment in a firm using new technologies 
in a developing country therefore requires some implicit or explicit form of loss-
financing as the organization cannot by definition achieve competitiveness for some 
considerable time. This marks a very significant difference between advanced and 
developing countries. In the former, the financing of machinery and buildings to set 
up production may face uncertainties in terms of markets and prices if the product is a 
new one, but the organizational capabilities of the firm and its workers are typically 
not in question. In developing countries, the markets and prices are well known by 
definition because the product is a well-known one, the uncertainty is about the 
organizational capabilities of the team attempting to produce the product. While the 
uncertainty faced by innovating firms in advanced countries is well understood, the 
uncertainty faced by learning firms in developing countries is often ignored in 
economic theory and policy.  
 
In principle the lower profits or even losses that firms face during their period of 
organizational capability development could be privately financed as there is the 
potential of future profits. The absence of significant private engagement in 
investments in learning-by-doing in developing countries suggests the presence of 
important contracting failures that keeps private investors away from this difficult 
task. The difficulty is not surprising given that a locally specific organizational design 
is required to achieve competitiveness. External investors who may finance the 
learning have neither a blueprint of the organizational design that may work nor can 
they easily observe the effort the production team is putting in to achieve the 
competitive organization rapidly. In practice, governments in the past have therefore 
played a significant role in financing infant industry strategies. However, the relative 
paucity of successful infant industry programmes demonstrates the difficulty of 
getting the governance capabilities right for ensuring successful outcomes in these 
public financing strategies. Clearly, ensuring high levels of effort in these learning 
processes is by no means a simple affair.   
 
The loss-financing required to engage in learning-by-doing depends on the gap 
between the domestic cost of production and the global price at that quality. The loss 
financing that would allow production (and learning-by-doing) to commence can be 
measured as a per unit ‘subsidy’, sQ, which brings the initially higher domestic cost of 
production domesticQC  into line with the global price 
global
QP . The ‘subsidy’ does not have 
to be a transfer from government and could be private loss financing in the form of 
investors accepting a lower mark-up or putting in additional cash to cover a period of 
loss-making. When the loss-financing involves a public subsidy, this can also be 
delivered in a variety of ways, some explicit, others more subtle. The possibilities 
include export subsidies, import protection, subsidized interest rates, subsidized inputs 
or infrastructure, or a cash subsidy. Thus a variety of financing instruments are 
available to enable learning-by-doing to commence, and in general we can describe 
these instruments as ways of providing ‘rents for learning’ (Khan 2000a).  
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The essential features of the problem can be described by focusing on the situation 
where the domestic firm can produce products of quality Q, but at a higher cost than 
the current global price. The required effective rate of subsidy, sQ, is given by the 
equality: 
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Inserting eq. [2] that defines domesticQC  into this gives the required sQ: 
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If follows from [4] that: 
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The required rate of subsidy declines if the global price rises, or if domestic labour 
productivity, input productivity or capital productivity rise. It follows that the more 
rapidly domestic labour, input and capital productivities grow, the sooner the subsidy 
can be removed. The subsidy per unit required for entering production is also likely to 
be higher for higher quality levels. Lower and higher quality versions of the same 
product are indexed by Q and Q+1. Using [3], the per-unit subsidy required in each 
case is shown in equations [5] and [6]. 
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And  
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Under plausible assumptions sQ+1 > sQ, meaning a higher subsidy is required if a firm 
wants to engage in producing higher quality products. The organization required to 
produce a more complex product is generally also more complex. The gap in tacit 
knowledge is therefore likely to be greater for constructing the more complex 
organization. Both the gap in labour productivity and gaps in input productivities are 
likely to be greater in higher quality products because the latter typically require more 
sophisticated production routines and more sophisticated management of inputs. The 
greater labour and input productivity gaps between the two countries in quality Q+1 
compared to quality Q can be represented as a set of inequalities: 
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The bigger gap in organizational knowledge for higher quality products is also likely 
to show up in lower initial capital productivity for higher quality products. In 
addition, capital productivity in higher qualities is likely to be further affected by the 
fact that higher quality production often requires more expensive machinery and is 
therefore likely to require a larger scale of production to become competitive. The low 
initial competitiveness of the firm can therefore create a further problem because the 
firm may find it difficult to achieve the scale economies to raise its output-capital 
ratio, implying a greater gap in capital productivity in higher quality products: 
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Returning to equations [1] and [2] we know that the costs of production in both 
countries are inversely proportional to their labour, input and capital productivities. 
Given the likelihood that some or all of the inequalities in [7] and [8] are likely to 
hold, it must be the case that  
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The inequality in [9] says that the cost of production in the developing country is 
greater (relative to the global price) for the higher quality product compared to the 
lower quality product. Using inequality [9] and comparing equations [5] and [6] it 
follows that a greater subsidy per unit will be required to overcome the initial 
competitiveness gap in the higher quality product compared to the lower quality 
product. 
 
QQ ss >+1  [10] 
  
These results suggest a number of propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. The loss-financing required to begin production is in general higher 
the higher the quality of the product and moreover, the subsidy will be required for 
longer as more complex organizational capabilities have to be developed.  
 
As against this, the development of more complex organizational capabilities has a 
number of advantages.  
 
Proposition 2. The production of higher quality products is desirable simply because 
their production adds more value relative to lower quality products.  
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A further proposition is plausible. Economics textbooks often show technical progress 
as an outward shift of a production frontier for a country. In reality, this is misleading 
because improvements in technological capabilities are likely to be localized around 
specific technologies (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969; Stiglitz 1987). The localization of 
productivity improvements is even more likely if competitiveness is embedded in the 
routines of particular organizations. In this case successful learning is likely to benefit 
the future adoption of technologies that are similar or closely related, rather than 
raising potential productivity across all technologies. Thus, we are likely to see 
‘bumpy’ improvements in productivity clustered around particular technologies. This 
can explain why countries specialize in clusters of related products, possibly triggered 
by the random success of learning-by-doing in particular sectors. This is why it can be 
advantageous to acquire organizational capabilities in more advanced technologies 
producing higher quality products. Innovation in advanced countries is also more 
likely in higher quality products like electronics than lower quality products like 
garments. A follower country that has organizations capable of producing higher 
quality products is therefore more likely to benefit from further productivity growth 
by adopting incremental improvements in these products as innovation happens in 
more advanced countries.  
 
Proposition 3. Learning-by-doing improves organizational capabilities for producing 
related products and if future productivity growth is likely to be faster in higher 
quality products, it is beneficial to develop more complex organizational capabilities. 
 
The development challenge is therefore to accelerate the movement up the quality 
ladder subject to feasibility defined by the loss-financing capabilities of the society 
and its ability to solve the contracting failures that result in adverse outcomes for loss 
financing strategies.  
 
 
Figure 1 Loss Financing and Learning-by-doing  
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Figure 1 summarizes some of the fundamental issues facing catching up and 
technology acquisition in developing countries. The competitiveness curve for a 
country summarizes its distance from global competitiveness across different quality 
products. The x-axis measures the quality of the product, and the y-axis the follower’s 
competitiveness in producing that quality. Competitiveness is measured by the ratio 
domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
. A higher ratio therefore implies greater competitiveness of our country 
given the prices set by the leader. When this ratio is 1 or higher our country can sell a 
product of this quality in global markets and therefore the horizontal line at 1 can be 
read as the global competitiveness frontier for our country. When the ratio is less than 
1 for a particular quality, our country will either not be able to produce that quality or 
will require (temporary) loss-financing to allow production. The required rate of 
‘subsidy’, sQ, equals domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
−1  in eq. [5], and is shown in Figure 1 as the gap 
between the global competitiveness frontier (the horizontal line at P/C=1) and current 
competitiveness at quality Q defined by the current competitiveness curve.  
 
The competitiveness curve is downward sloping because although world prices of 
higher quality products are higher (which is why they are more desirable to produce), 
the cost of production in the follower country is even higher, giving it a greater 
disadvantage in higher quality products. The greater productivity gap in higher 
qualities will force market-reliant developing countries to specialize in low quality 
products. This may have nothing to do with the relative price of labour and capital as 
in standard neoclassical theory. Consistent with proposition 1, it is possible to imagine 
a developing country like B in Figure 1 where current organizational capabilities are 
so low that it cannot even produce the lowest quality of the product. In extreme cases, 
some developing countries may struggle to produce competitive qualities of any 
product. The competitiveness curve can be extended to apply to related products of 
different complexity. For instance, we could see different ‘qualities’ as parts of a 
vertically organized value chain. Low qualities could be low value-added parts of the 
value chain (like packing and assembling), medium qualities could be the production 
of intermediate products going into the assembly and higher qualities could be design, 
product development and marketing. Once again, the typical developing country 
would struggle to locate itself at the lower ends of the value chain where the 
organizational gap was less challenging, and many may not even succeed in that. At 
an even more general level, we could use the capability curve to think about choices 
across all products ranked by production complexity for which ‘quality’ is a proxy.  
 
Figure 1 suggests that a country like B will need loss-financing of sBQ1 from the outset 
to begin production even of low-quality products Q1 at point U. The success of a 
strategy of loss-financing would be measured by the pace at which productivity 
increased as a result of learning-by-doing. Successful learning-by-doing should result 
in the competitiveness curve moving upward till the loss-financing was no longer 
required at V. Note that this does not necessarily require achieving levels of 
productivity equal to the leader country because the follower is likely to have a wage 
and cost advantage for some inputs. Sustained productivity growth is therefore likely 
to raise the follower’s competitiveness to more than 1, in which case the follower 
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could either earn a rent (a mark-up higher than mQ) at the global price or it could bid 
down the global price in these qualities to below a price acceptable to the leader, 
thereby displacing the leader from these segments of the market and achieving more 
sales. If the latter is the more profitable option, the developing country becomes the 
leader for that quality and the global price is eventually defined by the cost of 
production and market power of the new leader.  
 
Finally, proposition 3 tells us that if future technological progress is localized around 
higher qualities and technologies, it may be desirable to further accelerate the move 
up the quality ladder to the points where innovation is still happening in more 
advanced countries. In Figure 1 the potential future productivity growth at quality Q1 
may be relatively low because the technology is already mature and no further 
product and process innovations may happen at this quality level. Thus, for country A, 
which can produce Q1 competitively, the imperative may be to move to a higher 
quality not only to prepare for future competition from country B, but also to enjoy 
faster productivity growth clustered around quality Q2. Thus, for country A, there may 
be a policy justification to assist learning-by-doing around quality Q2 by organizing 
temporary loss-financing of sAQ2. The challenge for A would be to go from point X to 
point Y to achieve competitiveness at this higher quality level. This would not only 
allow the country to raise its domestic value-added and living standards, it may also 
ensure faster productivity growth in the future.  
 
But if temporary loss-financing can assist a country to raise its productivity through 
learning-by-doing, how high should a country aim? Proposition 1 tells us that given 
existing capabilities, the higher the quality level that the country tries to achieve, the 
greater the financing cost measured by sQ. Moreover, the greater the gap with leading 
countries at that quality, the longer is the catching up likely to take to reach the global 
competitiveness frontier. As a result, trying to aim too high may involve excessively 
long periods of subsidization. Moreover, the competitiveness gap is only partially due 
to the absence of tacit knowledge. Some of the gap could also be due to levels of 
formal education and skills and the poor quality of economy-level public goods. If the 
initial gap is too big no amount of firm-level experience and learning-by-doing may 
remove it entirely. As both the social time preference and the cost of finance in poor 
countries are likely to be high, there is a limit to how high up the quality ladder it is 
feasible to go.  
 
2. Learning, Effort and Governance   
Investments in new sectors can be constrained by a variety of contracting failures. 
However, the contracting failures that affect learning are different from other 
contracting failures that can constrain investments for other reasons. These include 
several different types of appropriability problems limiting future profits in the 
presence of externalities and the costs of coordinating complementary investments. 
The solutions to different contracting failures can appear to be deceptively similar, for 
instance many of them can involve some form of subsidy or assistance. In principle, 
several contracting failures may also be operating simultaneously to constrain 
investments in technology acquisition. Nevertheless, distinguishing different 
contracting failures is important because the governance requirements for effectively 
addressing them can be markedly different. Policies supporting technology acquisition 
in the past often yielded poor results because the relevant contracting failures were 
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not properly identified and understood. As a result, policies were not designed to be 
effective in solving these contracting problems with existing governance capabilities, 
nor were the governance capabilities necessary for the success of specific policies 
identified and developed.  
 
Table 1 Major Contracting Failures Affecting Technology Acquisition 
Contracting failures 
Affecting Investment 
Likely Policy Instruments Governance Capabilities 
required for Implementation 
Appropriability problems 
facing investments in skills: 
investors cannot capture full 
benefits of training  
Public co-financing of 
labour training and 
investments in skills 
Capabilities in relevant 
agencies to ensure financing 
for training is not misallocated 
or wasted 
Appropriability problems 
facing innovators: Poor 
protection of innovation rents 
can discourage advanced 
technology investors 
Protection of IPRs. But 
TRIPS may be too 
restrictive and MNCs may 
have weak incentives to 
transfer technologies 
Enforcement capabilities for 
IPRs but also policies and 
strategies to encourage 
technology transfer by MNCs 
Appropriability problems 
facing ‘discovery’: First 
movers do not capture full 
benefits of discovering 
comparative advantage  
Subsidies for first mover 
start-up companies in new 
sectors 
Capability to make subsidies 
time limited 
Failures of Coordination: 
Complementary supporting 
sectors do not develop, 
constraining investment 
Indicative or incentivized 
strategies for coordinating 
investments 
Significant governance 
capabilities required to 
coordinate and discipline 
investments across sectors 
Problem of Contracting 
High Effort in Learning: 
Financing technological-
organizational learning fails 
because of low effort  
Public co-financing or 
sharing of risks of 
financing the learning of 
tacit technological and 
organizational capabilities 
Financing instruments must be 
compatible with governance 
capabilities to ensure credible 
compulsions for high effort 
learning-by-doing  
Source: Author 
 
Table 1 outlines a number of critical contracting failures affecting technology 
acquisition, the likely policy responses and the governance capabilities required to 
make the policies effective. Most of these contracting failures have been discussed in 
the literature but the differences in the governance capabilities required to address 
them have not received sufficient attention (Khan 2009). The positive externalities of 
investments in skills can result in an appropriability problem for investors and 
underinvestment in skills (Dosi 1988; Khan 2000a). Corrective policy involves 
subsidizing skills development and the required governance capabilities are to 
monitor outcomes and withdraw public funding if expected outcomes are not 
achieved. Spillovers can also affect investments in innovation, which requires the 
temporary protection of technology rents. While this is primarily a concern for 
advanced countries that rely on innovation for growth, developing countries may have 
to protect the intellectual property rights of multinationals in order to attract advanced 
technology investments (Hoekman, et al. 2004). Apart from a capability to protect 
intellectual property rights, technology transfer also requires significant negotiating 
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skills on the part of policy-makers in developing countries to negotiate technology 
transfer strategies with multinationals (Khan 2000a; Stiglitz 2007).  
 
A further set of spillovers affect investments in ‘discovering’ new areas of 
comparative advantage (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). Although the proposition that 
countries have hidden comparative advantages that need to be discovered is not 
particularly convincing, the possibility that first movers may not be able to capture the 
full benefits of their investment can justify subsidizing investments in new sectors. 
One reason that first movers may fail to get the full benefit of their discovery is that 
profits may be bid down by imitators whose entry pushes up wages. To the extent that 
this problem dampens investment in discovery, the appropriate policy response is to 
subsidize investments in new sectors and the governance capability required is to 
ensure that the subsidies are only available to reduce the costs of the start-up phase.  
 
A further problem is that of coordination failures affecting investments across sectors 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Nurkse 1953; Scitovsky 1954; Murphy, et al. 1989). This 
problem is well-known in the development literature, but solving it is difficult and 
requires significant capabilities in information gathering, understanding demand and 
supply complementarities and implementing the coordination effectively. These 
capabilities are typically missing in developing countries and development planning 
efforts therefore usually achieve very little. Our focus is on the last of the contracting 
problems in Table 1, the problem of contracting high-effort learning. Solutions to all 
the other problems in the table presume that the technological and organizational 
capabilities to set up competitive organizations already exist. In reality, developing 
countries lack the capabilities to use modern technologies and without this, attempted 
solutions to other problems are unlikely to have any effect. Unfortunately, this too is a 
particularly difficult problem to solve. Strategies of subsidization without incentives 
and compulsions to induce high effort in the learning process are likely to fail.  
 
Private investment in financing learning may be motivated by the following type of 
calculation: An investment of sQ in loss-financing has the prospect of achieving a 
competitiveness of domestic
Q
global
Q
C
P
 ≥ 1 after n years. As the follower country has lower 
wages, productivity growth could eventually result in a cost of production lower than 
the world price. If productivity improves sufficiently, the investor can earn a normal 
profit of mQ or even a rent in the form of a higher mark-up of mQ' > mQ (after n years) 
with an expectation that the rent mQ' – mQ will last for x years. The mark-up can 
decline over time for a number of reasons including the entry of new firms in the 
sector that bids up wages. The magnitudes of sQ, n, and if relevant, mQ' – mQ and x, 
and the discount rate or cost of finance facing the entrepreneur will determine whether 
the investment in learning-by-doing is privately profitable. Private investments in 
learning may happen even without the prospect of rents because the normal mark-up 
mQ may be attractive enough given the alternative opportunities of the investor even 
taking into account the extra investment in loss-financing. This is therefore a different 
problem from the discovery problem where a private investor in a new sector will not 
invest without a subsidy because the social benefit from discovery is always greater 
than the private benefit, which may even be negative.  
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In the learning problem, the contracting failure is internal to the firm and its investors 
as the latter find it difficult to ensure effort in learning. If this problem can be solved 
then private investments may happen. If the contracting problem of ensuring high 
effort cannot be solved, public policy has to co-finance or share the risk of financing 
learning. However, in some cases the configuration of costs and benefits may require 
a higher return to justify the investment in learning than the return that is achievable 
even with high effort. The required higher return may not be achievable because it 
may not be feasible to achieve a low enough cost of production to generate the 
required private rents even with feasibly high effort or it may not be possible to 
achieve the rents for long enough because new entrants reduce the returns of the first 
mover by raising wages rapidly (as in the discovery model). In these cases there may 
be a second reason why public policy should co-finance learning and that is that the 
social return on learning may be higher than the feasible private return. This provides 
additional justification for subsidizing first-movers investing in learning in a 
particular sector. But even in cases where investments in learning have positive 
spillovers for society, if the public support for learning does not solve the problem of 
ensuring high levels of effort the exercise as a whole is likely to fail. This is what 
makes the solution of the learning problem different from the solution of the pure 
discovery problem and other positive externality problems which only require the 
provision of time-bound subsidies. 
 
Effort is important for the learning problem because the development of technological 
and organizational capabilities requires both time and effort. Time and effort are 
inversely related: the lower the effort, the longer the learning takes. In Figure 1 firms 
in country B may be unable to begin production at point U without loss-financing, but 
the feasibility of the financing depends on how long firms take to go from U to V, or 
even whether V will ever be reached. The rate at which the competitiveness curve 
rises depends on the degree of effort that is put into the learning process once loss 
financing allows learning-by-doing to commence. Unfortunately, disciplining the 
learning process is a difficult problem to solve. Without incentives and compulsions, a 
production team can keep on repeating procedures without the innovations and 
experiments that improve its productivity. This is particularly the case if the firm can 
make a political case for continuing with the subsidy. The political alliances of firms 
can make subsidy withdrawal too costly for many governments. The institutional and 
political background can therefore set constraints on what can be done. The ‘learning’ 
process can then continue indefinitely, as countries with infant industries that refused 
to grow up have discovered. Indeed, even if the learning process is just a little too 
slow, financing may become unviable in terms of opportunity costs. Moreover, if the 
public or private investors who may have financed the learning suspect its viability, 
they are unlikely to engage in the financing in the first place.  
 
The time required for achieving competitiveness, defined as the break-even period Bt, 
can plausibly be determined by a number of variables. First, it depends on the initial 
gap between the country and the global leader which we can measure by the initial 
competitiveness gap that the subsidy sQ is required to cover. The greater the initial 
gap, the longer it will take to catch up. Second, the time required for learning depends 
on the effort of the participants in the learning process. This includes both the 
individual efforts in acquiring technological capabilities, but even more so the 
management effort in acquiring organizational capabilities. Whatever the initial gap, a 
higher effort is likely to result in faster convergence. Effort can be measured by the 
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intensity of application of workers and managers to continually improve productivity. 
This can be observed as the rate at which managers and workers experiment with and 
adapt production processes to achieve improvements in productivity. As 
experimentation and trials impose costs on individuals, the result can be conflicts as 
there may be distributive implications in redefining jobs. Thus, higher levels of effort 
imply costs for participants and particularly for managers. As already noted, the effort 
referred to here is not the intensity of the work process in general, but the effort 
expended in learning to raise productivity. Typically, low productivity is not the effect 
of laziness or low effort in general on the part of the workforce (though that may be a 
marginal contributor) but rather of a failure of effort on the part of the production 
team as a whole to evolve routines and organizational structures that raise individual 
productivity, improve quality control, reduce the wastage of inputs, reduce 
bottlenecks in production and improve capacity utilization.  
 
Finally, the break-even period can also depend on country and firm specific factors. 
Country specific factors refer to general levels of education, exposure to technology, 
the prior history of organized modern production, infrastructural quality and so on. If 
a country is significantly behind in its formal technological capabilities it may fail to 
approach required levels of competitiveness within any feasible time period. An 
example of this would be the absence of a sufficient number of formally trained 
engineers of a particular type required in the production process. Firm level factors 
refer to idiosyncratic differences in the quality of entrepreneurship, the quality of 
technicians and managers inherited by a firm and so on. These variables are 
summarized in eq. [11]: 
 
( )FCesfB Qt ,,,=  [11] 
  
The break-even period Bt is likely to be longer the higher the initial gap in 
competitiveness measured by sQ, the lower the level of effort, e, and if C and F, which 
describe country-specific and firm-specific factors respectively are adverse. Figure 2 
tracks the pace at which the competitiveness curves in Figure 1 move up as a result of 
different levels of effort. To simplify, we assume that the value of other variables is 
such that it is potentially possible for the country to achieve competitiveness in 
quality Q. At time t=1 country A’s competitiveness is too low for it to begin the 
production of quality Q without loss-financing. The initial loss financing is sQ in 
Figure 2. If effort levels are high, the break-even period Bt = n periods. At that point, 
loss financing can be abandoned and indeed if improvements in productivity continue, 
the country may even be in a position to earn rents in subsequent periods. 
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Figure 2 Effort Levels and the Viability of the Learning Process  
 
The problem for the successful firm is that its reward for success is the loss of the rent 
it was getting in the form of loss-financing. The firm will have substituted a future of 
uncertain market profits and rents based on continuing efforts at productivity growth 
for a subsidy that allowed it to perform with low productivity. There is obviously an 
incentive compatibility problem here that can result in ‘satisficing’ behaviour on the 
part of management. The existing routines of production within the firm may be 
difficult and costly to change and it may be easier to spend management effort in 
protecting the subsidy. Not surprisingly, managers typically put a lot of effort into 
developing organizational capability and competitiveness when there are credible 
compulsions and pressures on them from outside the firm, possibly from the financing 
agencies. Otherwise a satisficing strategy may emerge that puts low effort into 
learning and more effort into protecting the subsidy. Competitiveness may never be 
achieved even with some productivity growth as productivity is also increasing in the 
leader. The infant industry will fail to grow up and eventually the catching-up 
strategies will have to be abandoned, but this may be many years later and managers 
and workers may not be too concerned about this right away. 
 
Owner-managers financing learning-by-doing in their own organizations would not 
have to subcontract the management of the learning effort. However, it is unlikely that 
a single owner-manager will be able to finance a period of loss-making for any 
organization of substantial size. When external financiers are involved, they have to 
contract with the owner and managers of the firm to ensure high levels of effort since 
their returns depend on the achievement of competitiveness. The contracting problem 
is that the enforcement of complex contingent contracts is usually ruled out in a 
developing country given the weakness of contract enforcement.  The overall loss-
financing sQ is therefore likely to be partly or entirely from public sources, 
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particularly in cases where a significant organizational gap exists between the country 
and the market leader. The financing instruments can however vary widely, including 
import protection, export subsidies, subsidized credit and other forms of interventions 
that change relative prices and reduce or remove the losses of the learning company. 
However, while some level of public co-financing may be necessary, appropriate 
governance conditions are also required to ensure high effort. The outcome depends 
on the details of the financing instrument and the enforceability of the conditions 
critical for the success of that instrument. Enforceability depends on the governance 
capabilities of the relevant public agencies and the holding power of the organizations 
involved in the financing arrangement to resist enforcement. An important 
determinant of enforceability is therefore the macro-level distribution of power 
between firms, political organizations and enforcement agencies of different types, 
and we call this the political settlement (Khan 1995, 2010).  
 
Our understanding of industrial policy has been influenced by the experience of 
countries like South Korea where centrally allocated learning rents achieved the rapid 
development of technological and organizational capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s. 
For a variety of historical reasons, East Asian states were untypical because their 
political settlements allowed the enforcement of tough conditions on domestic firms 
receiving support (Khan 2009; Khan and Blankenburg 2009). The financing provided 
to the chaebol through low interest loans, protected domestic markets and export 
subsidies came with conditions, for instance for achieving export targets. These 
conditions ensured high levels of effort because the enforcement of these conditions 
was credible. The state could not only withdraw subsidies; it could also re-allocate 
plants to different owners if they were more likely to enhance competitiveness.  
 
Note that it was not ‘good governance’ that enabled the South Korean state to achieve 
rapid learning with its centralized industrial policy. The enforcement of performance 
conditions was not based on the enforcement of detailed formal contracts. Moreover, 
the withdrawal of subsidies or the re-allocation of plants usually did not respect 
property rights and the rule of law. Nor was corruption low in South Korea in the 
1960s and 1970s. What mattered was that state agencies had the capacity to enforce 
conditions that it was in their interest to enforce, and that had the effect of ensuring 
high-effort learning (Khan 1996, 2000b). The conditions themselves were subject to 
negotiation and the industrial policy system as a whole evolved as state agencies 
discovered and developed their enforcement capabilities. What is distinctive here is 
that firms discovered that subsidies could be withdrawn and even their plants could be 
re-allocated if they failed to raise their productivity. In contrast, in Pakistan at around 
the same period a similar system of centrally directed subsidies could not be matched 
with equivalent enforcement capabilities. The greater dispersion of power across 
political and bureaucratic organizations in this political settlement allowed firms to 
make alliances and satisficing rent-sharing agreements with particular political and 
state organizations to protect their rents (Khan 1999). Not surprisingly policy did not 
evolve in the direction of enforcing conditions on firms receiving support as state 
agencies and firms knew that setting such conditions would not be credible. As a 
result, technological and organizational capabilities developed much more slowly and 
many sectors did not achieve competitiveness at all. 
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3. Financing Learning with Imperfect Governance: Two Case Studies 
Fortunately, the South Korean model of centralized subsidy allocation is not the only 
one available for addressing the contracting failures affecting learning (Khan 2000a, 
2000b). In political settlements less conducive for centralized monitoring and 
enforcement, other types of financing have proven successful in driving capability 
development. In the two cases examined here, learning and capability development 
succeeded because the design of the financing created incentives and compulsions for 
effort without requiring centralized monitoring and enforcement by state agencies. 
Nevertheless, state agencies played a critical role in setting up the financing 
arrangements, and the enforcement capabilities of some agencies were important in 
making the arrangements effective overall.  
 
The Indian subcontinent did not perform very well with centralized industrial policy 
instruments in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s the centralized policies started to 
unravel and exactly around that time a number of competitive sectors began to 
emerge. These instances of success are therefore often presented as success stories of 
liberalization, but the reality is more complex. We look at two sectors: automobiles in 
India and garments in Bangladesh. The transformation of these sectors into 
competitive ones involved new responses to contracting failures and in particular, new 
financing instruments emerged that created incentives and compulsions for high levels 
of learning effort that were credible in the political settlements of these countries.  
 
The Indian Automobile Industry 
In the 1950s and 1960s, centralized Indian industrial policy helped to build up a car 
industry that produced around 40,000 cars annually but of generally low quality. A 
protected domestic market and other implicit subsidies provided the loss-financing to 
low competitiveness producers that enabled them to produce Indian cars. However, 
low levels of compulsion for effort meant that the low-tech Ambassador never 
became a globally competitive product. In the 1980s, the apparatus of centralized 
industrial policy began to unwind, and at the same time, the sector went through 
dramatic changes. Quality and competitiveness began to rapidly improve and by 2009 
Indian producers were producing 1.8 million cars, many of them of export quality 
(around 330,000 units that year) making India the fourth largest global exporter. It 
appeared that market opening had forced quality and productivity growth exactly as 
liberal economists had predicted. However, a closer look tells us that learning still 
faced contracting failures and the state played an important though different role in 
co-financing a new and much more successful phase of high-effort learning.  
 
Indian industrial policy had been supporting capability development in cars from the 
1950s with the Ambassador produced by Hindustan Motors (part of the Birla group) 
and the Indian version of a Fiat called the Premier Padmini. Industrial policy was also 
assisting the manufacture of trucks and buses by Tata and tractors and jeeps by 
Mahindra and Mahindra. India was also developing tier one and two component 
producers even if they were not competitive relative to market leaders. The 
acceleration in the development of competitiveness in the 1980s came about as a 
result of an accidental train of events set off by Sanjay Gandhi (the prime minister’s 
younger son) who decided in the 1970s to build a ‘People’s Car’: the Maruti. Early 
attempts to interest Volkswagen in the joint venture were not successful and the 
project was floundering when Sanjay died in an air crash in 1980 leaving a factory 
with no immediate prospects of producing anything. The potential loss of prestige for 
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the Gandhi name made Indira’s government look for effective policies that in effect 
created new financing instruments for the transfer of technological and organizational 
capabilities to India. In 1980, the government of India took over the initially private 
Gandhi family venture and incorporated it in 1981 as a public sector company called 
Maruti Udyog Ltd. After a long and committed search by top Indian bureaucrats for a 
foreign technology provider, an agreement was signed with Suzuki in 1982, with the 
latter taking a 26 per cent equity stake in the company.  
 
Suzuki, then mainly a motorcycle manufacturer with a relatively minor interest in 
automobiles had the advantage of knowing the Indian market and political system as 
they had been scouting for business in the motorcycle sector for some time. They 
recognized that the Indian government was serious about making this project work. 
The Indian government was effectively willing to open up the protected domestic 
market with the large rents that had previously been available for domestic learners to 
a foreign investor if the latter was willing to make a significant investment in 
transferring capabilities. The domestic market rents were a significant prize for 
Suzuki and this allowed the Indian government to insist on significant domestic 
content along the lines required by its Phased Manufacturing Programme, which 
required 95 per cent local content in five years (Becker-Ritterspach 2007: 9). The 
joint venture agreement with Suzuki specified 70 per cent non-company value 
addition of which at least 60 per cent would be locally procured. On the other hand 
the government’s commitment to make the project work was critical for Suzuki. This 
ensured that the policy changes that were required to make the project succeed could 
be pushed through. For instance, Suzuki managed to get permission to import gear 
boxes at low tariffs despite the opposition of the Indian machine tool industry. This 
made the pace of indigenization feasible while maintaining quality.  
 
The result was a new type of arrangement for financing learning. Suzuki was expected 
to make significant up-front investments in learning and put in the effort to transfer 
organizational and technological capabilities to its Indian factory and to the Indian 
supplier chain. But given the risks and costs Suzuki would almost certainly not have 
made these significant investments without the implicit public co-financing in the 
form of the very substantial ex post rents available in the protected domestic market. 
These potential rewards were great enough to cover Suzuki’s investments and risks in 
financing the learning. The result was incentive compatibility between the state and 
the recipient of the rent without the necessity of centralized monitoring and 
enforcement. This was achieved because Suzuki’s ability to recover its investments in 
learning depended on its success in producing the higher quality car to capture the 
domestic market from existing producers and meeting the domestic content 
requirements, a condition that was easy to monitor and within the capabilities of the 
Indian state to enforce. Its effort in managing the learning process was therefore 
assured and did not have to be monitored in terms of effort or quality of outcomes.  
 
The result was a remarkable transformation of the competitiveness of the Indian 
automobile sector based on a significant transfer of technological and organizational 
capabilities. As Maruti’s plant at Gurgaon was virtually an empty shell, the Japanese 
used the organizational structure of their plant at Kosai as the template around which 
to develop an appropriate Indian organizational structure. The relatively flat Japanese 
organizational structure could not be replicated in its entirety as Indian managerial 
hierarchies were resistant to change. But a high effort learning-by-doing process 
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resulted in the evolution of a new hybrid organizational structure that was much more 
efficient than previous Indian organizations. Even more remarkable was the success 
of Suzuki’s supplier development programme, which worked with initially 
technologically weak and suspicious suppliers to improve their organizational and 
technological capabilities in order to meet domestic content requirements and reduce 
input costs for the planned low cost car. The organizational evolution in Gurgaon and 
throughout the supplier chain involved considerable investments of effort and 
resources by Suzuki but the results were very positive. By 1983 Maruti-Suzuki had 
captured 50 per cent of the lucrative protected domestic market as a result of rapid 
improvements in quality, displacing the slumbering Ambassador from its dominant 
position in the market. By the late 1990s, Indian tier one component producers began 
to win international prizes for quality like the Japanese Deming Prize.  
 
Several aspects of the financing instruments and governance capabilities are important 
for explaining these outcomes. First, the ex post rent was clearly a big enough prize 
for Suzuki to justify its risky investments in building new capabilities. The prize was 
access to the large protected domestic market, which remained protected even a 
decade later in the 1990s and even after India began to formally liberalize. In 1993-
94, three years after liberalization began, the nominal rate of tariffs on automobiles 
was still 85 per cent, and this only declined to 60 per cent in 2006-07. The effective 
rate of protection was even higher and actually increased over this period from 88 per 
cent to 183 per cent because of a decline in the rate of protection for components 
(Badri and Vashisht 2008: 84-5). If the ex post prize was small, it may not have 
justified the significant investments and effort in improving technological and 
organizational capabilities right through the supply chain. Secondly, high ex post rents 
alone would not have ensured that Suzuki would spend so much effort in transforming 
the domestic supply chain rather than importing the required inputs. This required 
enforceable domestic content requirements. Fortunately, the agencies monitoring 
these outcomes were credible in India and the political settlement was such that 
foreign companies (even if they wanted to) would have found it difficult to buy 
political protection if they had failed to deliver on their contractual commitments. 
India was also lucky in that in the 1980s it was still not constrained by WTO rules 
(India only joined the WTO in 1995) and it could therefore set domestic content 
requirements for foreign investors. 
 
The Maruti-Suzuki partnership transformed automobile production in India even 
though the company did not remain in Indian hands for long. By 1987 Suzuki had 
increased its equity stake to 40 per cent and by 1992 to 50 per cent. After a protracted 
conflict over the appointment of the managing director in 1997, the Government of 
India began to divest its holdings and Suzuki rapidly became the dominant 
shareholder. However, by then Suzuki had transformed the Indian automobile 
industry by enhancing the competitiveness of Indian-owned tier one and tier two 
producers. The increasingly competitive supplier network began to attract foreign and 
Indian car manufacturers who continued to benefit from the financing arrangement 
that co-financed learning based on the formula of steep domestic content requirements 
combined with access to the protected domestic market. In the 1990s, 
DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Toyota and others followed 
Suzuki in similar deals. Domestic content requirements made successive technology 
providers invest further in technology transfer to the supply chain. By 2004, the 
development of domestically owned tier one capabilities allowed Indian producers 
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like Tata and Mahindra and Mahindra to produce Indian branded cars with domestic 
content ranging from 20 to 100 per cent depending on the model.  
 
The Bangladeshi Garments Industry  
The dramatic growth of the labour-intensive garment industry in Bangladesh in the 
1980s and beyond is another interesting story of how the financing of learning 
matters, particularly because it is often assumed that learning is not particularly 
important in low-technology industries like garments. Like automobiles in India, the 
garments industry in Bangladesh is often portrayed in the popular press as a success 
story of liberalization. The problem with the comparative advantage narrative is that 
low wages in Bangladesh did not result in the rapid growth of any other labour-
intensive sector, and other developing countries with low wages and liberal economic 
policies have not experienced the dramatic growth observed in the garments sector in 
Bangladesh.  
 
The answer to these puzzles is the importance of learning even in apparently low 
technology sectors and the specific ways in which the learning problem was solved in 
the Bangladeshi garments industry. As in the Indian automobile sector, the growth of 
the garments industry was associated with the emergence of a successful financing 
mechanism that created incentives for high-effort learning. One part of the 
‘instrument’ financing learning in the Bangladeshi garment sector was the lucky 
accident of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement or MFA. This was set up in 1974 to protect 
US garments and textile manufactures from competition coming from established 
producers in countries like South Korea and Turkey. The established garment and 
textile countries were allocated quotas for US imports and as a way of getting the 
support of other developing countries, quota-free access was offered to less developed 
countries like Bangladesh that had no garments industry at all. Quota-free access 
created ‘quota rents’ for these countries because they could effectively sell at a higher 
price in US markets after the established exporters had exhausted their quotas. The 
quota rent was an intended policy outcome, but the intention was to primarily benefit 
US garments producers who were being threatened by cheaper imports from 
established producers. The unintended effect was that it potentially provided loss-
financing for learning in the garments sectors in countries like Bangladesh which 
were not competitive even though their wages were lower than the established 
garments exporters and much lower compared to the USA.  
 
The quota rent helped to artificially raise Bangladeshi competitiveness for a while but 
so great was the productivity gap between countries like Bangladesh and more 
advanced exporters that the MFA on its own would not have been sufficient to enable 
Bangladesh to produce for exports and engage in learning-by-doing. Indeed, the 
necessity of additional loss-financing and of appropriate incentives and compulsions 
for effort is demonstrated by the fact that there were other countries in Africa and 
Asia that were quota free but did not experience any explosive growth in this sector. 
However, the MFA raised world prices and reduced the competitiveness gap for 
Bangladesh and thereby created incentives for Bangladeshi and foreign technology 
providers to find additional financing for learning in order to scale the remaining 
competitiveness gap. Fortunately for Bangladesh, it had just begun to acquire a broad-
based group of potential investors appropriate for the development of a garments 
industry. Opportunities for primitive accumulation over the previous decade had 
helped to create a base of entrepreneurs who could potentially drive growth in the 
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sector provided the learning problem could be solved. The solution came in the form 
of a collaborative agreement between a Bangladeshi company, Desh Garments and 
the South Korean chaebol Daewoo in 1979. Daewoo had both textile and garments 
interests, but after its garment production was limited by the MFA it needed to sell its 
textiles to an offshore partner making garments. This made Daewoo able and willing 
to transfer the know-how of garments production to an offshore partner.  
 
The founder of Desh was Nurul Quader Khan, an ex-bureaucrat who had clearly 
benefited from the primitive accumulation of the 1970s and he had become a very rich 
man with substantial cash to invest. In the 1980s the military-backed government of 
Zia-ur-Rahman wanted industrialization and the president took the lead in 
underwriting the collaboration between Desh and Daewoo. As in India, the political 
commitment of the highest leadership to a particular project was more important than 
a general policy commitment to industrialization. It signalled to investors that small 
but specific problems that may otherwise have held up progress would be solved. 
Desh was responsible for all the physical investments in land and machinery in a 
modern garment factory in Bangladesh. The agreement with Daewoo was about 
financing the learning that would transform the factory and its workers into a 
competitive organization. Desh would literally purchase the requisite know-how from 
Daewoo, but as in the Suzuki case in India, Daewoo would invest in the learning first 
and would recover its investment when Desh became competitive. Daewoo did this by 
hosting at its own expense around 130 mid-level production managers from 
Bangladesh at its state-of-the-art garments factory in Busan (formerly Pusan). Their 
learning-by-doing in Busan was critical for acquiring the appropriate organizational 
and technological capabilities for modern garment manufacturing. Daewoo’s 
investment in financing this learning-by-doing would be paid back in the form of an 
8% royalty on the eventual sales of Desh. The composite financing of the learning 
thus came from a combination of the MFA quota rents (which reduced the 
competitiveness gap that Bangladesh had to climb) and further upfront investments by 
Daewoo that would be repaid by actual sales when Desh achieved competitiveness.  
 
The details of the financing structure help to explain why the stakeholders had strong 
incentives and compulsions to put in high levels of effort in rapidly transferring the 
tacit knowledge, particularly about the organization of production. Daewoo had a 
strong incentive to put in high levels of effort because it needed to sell textiles to 
Bangladesh, and it needed to recover its investments in learning through royalties 
from Desh as quickly as possible. With the teachers strongly incentivized, the learning 
by the students was already half ensured. At the same time, the Bangladeshis who 
went to Busan had a strong incentive to learn because they had nothing to gain by 
prolonging their stay in Busan. Moreover, these future managers may already have 
known that the organizational know-how they were acquiring could also be personally 
lucrative for them as potential garments entrepreneurs in their own right. Indeed, of 
the 130 mid-level managers who went to Busan for Desh, 115 eventually set up their 
own garment factories! 
 
The rate at which learning happened surprised all the participants. Desh had estimated 
that it would take five years of collaboration with Daewoo to achieve international 
competitiveness. But so successful was the learning at Busan and subsequently that 
the deal for cooperation on learning was terminated after less than two years. Desh’s 
growth and that of the Bangladesh garment industry was explosive: Desh grew at 
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around 90 per cent a year from 1981 to 1987. The Bangladesh garment industry grew 
from an almost zero base in 1980 to around 3500 medium sized firms in 2005 
employing more than 3 million workers and accounting for 70 per cent of 
Bangladesh’s exports. One of the ways in which Desh continued to create incentives 
for the learning effort of its managers was to allow them to leave and set up their own 
plants if they wished to do so. With large pools of labour, there was no threat of 
profits being squeezed by wage increases caused by a growing demand for labour in 
the garments industry as it grew. Moreover, as a critical part of the learning was 
evolving organizational design, the departure of individual managers was not a 
critical loss. On the contrary, the growth of an industrial cluster had many advantages 
in attracting buyers to Bangladesh. Fortunately for Bangladesh, Desh understood its 
basic economics and it did not create obstacles for managers who wanted to leave. 
Indeed, this created strong incentives for its managers to continue to experiment and 
develop organizational and technological capabilities and the company benefited from 
this ongoing learning and productivity enhancement. By 2010, Bangladesh had 
become the world’s third biggest garments exporter and continued to enjoy double-
digit growth in 2010 despite the global slowdown. 
 
The critical features of the financing instruments and the reasons for their success in 
financing learning were different in the Bangladeshi garments industry compared to 
the automobile sector in India. The public rent component here did not come from a 
protected domestic market but from the MFA, with its sources entirely outside 
Bangladesh. Bangladeshi producers had no credible mechanism to negotiate its 
allocation or extension. They rightly saw the MFA as a temporary arrangement and 
this too supported incentives for effort. The complementary private part of the 
financing instrument was the collaborative agreement between Desh and Daewoo 
where the investment in learning was made up-front by the South Korean partner with 
repayment from the sales of the Bangladeshi firm. This again created strong 
incentives for the rapid transmission and absorption of the relevant tacit knowledge. 
The role of the Bangladeshi government was limited but not negligible. The 
introductions between Desh and Daewoo took place through the direct intervention of 
President Zia. Informal government support that is perceived to be based on genuine 
commitment is often more credible than formal support in developing countries. 
Daewoo, like Suzuki in India found the commitment credible. It assured the foreign 
partner that administrative problems would be ironed out as indeed they were. Zia’s 
government and its successor pushed through critical institutional innovations like the 
back-to-back letter of credit (which allowed garments manufactures to finance raw 
material imports by using their export orders as collateral) and bonded warehouses, 
both of which reduced the financing cost of importing raw materials and fabrics. 
Indeed, so successful was the sector that Ronald Reagan imposed quotas on 
Bangladesh as early as 1985, just a few years after Desh began exporting.  
 
Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector now accounts for a similar share of GDP as India, 
largely because of the garments and textiles industry. The challenge for Bangladesh is 
to move up the value chain in the garment and textile industry and beyond. However, 
policy-makers do not generally see the success of the garments sector as an 
application of technology policy and there has been little progress in designing the 
types of financing instruments for high-effort learning that is required in other sectors. 
Upgrading within the garments industry is happening as a result of individual 
entrepreneurs with deep pockets investing in backward linkages. Bangladesh has 
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moved into fabrics and accessories, but the absence of policies to finance learning has 
constrained upgrading and the development of new sectors like electronics. As in 
India, the dominant public perception is that competition and comparative advantage 
explain the success of growth sectors. But the economics of comparative advantage 
cannot explain why other competitive labour-intensive sectors are not emerging, or 
why other poor countries that stood to gain from MFA did not in fact do so.  The 
examination of the garments takeoff shows that learning and tacit knowledge transfer 
were financed by a combination of private investments and public rents, and that the 
financing instruments were structured to create strong incentives for effort. The 
challenge is to design similarly effective learning processes in other sectors in 
Bangladesh and elsewhere. 
 
4. Conclusion  
An examination of successful growth sectors in the Indian subcontinent shows the 
importance of addressing the contracting failures affecting learning. The standard 
instruments of centralized industrial policy performed weakly in the past because they 
could not ensure high levels of effort given the political settlements in these countries. 
The ability of South Asian states (and perhaps states in developing countries in 
general) to withdraw targeted rents from domestic firms was too weak to be a credible 
threat that could induce sustained effort in learning. The examples from India and 
Bangladesh suggest that alternative mechanisms of financing that are credible in the 
context of their political settlements have to be sought and that in principle such 
financing instruments do exist. Sector-specific financing instruments have fared much 
better in the period after 1980, and explain the success of critical sectors. 
 
In both our sectors publicly created rents were important complements to private 
investment in learning. At the same time, private investments were necessary to create 
the incentives and compulsions for effort in contexts where the political settlement 
limited the state’s disciplining capabilities. In the Indian automobile industry, public 
policy created rents in the protected domestic market that indirectly financed learning. 
In the Bangladeshi garment industry, the public policy creating rents was located in 
the international trade architecture in the form of the MFA. Neither set of rents would 
necessarily play a positive role in inducing learning if they existed on their own. 
Indeed, India’s protected domestic market for automobiles did not induce anyone to 
aspire to global competitiveness. However, combined with the right type of private 
co-financing and some additional enforceable conditions, the public rents achieved 
remarkable results. Sadly, the public policies that created these particular rents in 
automobiles and garments would now be precluded by WTO rules. However, in the 
absence of any public rents for learners, the competitiveness gap in most sectors in 
South Asia and contracting difficulties would be likely to preclude purely private 
solutions to learning. One set of policy challenges is therefore to create public rents 
within WTO rules for sharing the costs of learning when private investors are 
unwilling to undertake the entire investment in learning on their own. If WTO rules 
prove to be too constraining for financing learning in developing countries, the rules 
need to be re-examined. 
 
Given the political settlements in South Asian countries, centralized public strategies 
of financing learning failed in the past because high levels of effort could not be 
enforced. The second feature of our successful learning cases was therefore the 
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critical role of private investments complementing the public financing of learning. 
The design of the financing instruments ensured high levels of effort because those 
responsible for organizing the learning were investing their own money first. 
Prolonging the learning process through satisficing strategies was unlikely to be a 
dominant strategy in this case. Instead, strong incentives and compulsions were 
created for high levels of effort in transferring the tacit knowledge quickly. Public co-
financing enhanced the ex post rewards and thereby reduced the risk facing these 
investors, inducing them to invest in financing learning in the presence of contracting 
failures. In both cases, the private investors who were financing the learning were also 
providing the organizational and technological knowhow. The investors therefore had 
a good idea of the knowledge that needed to be transferred and it was their assessment 
that the ex post rewards including the public rents promised satisfactory returns on 
their investments of resources and effort in ensuring the transfer. 
 
Thus, by combining public and private financing and structuring the private 
investments appropriately, the centralized monitoring and disciplining of learning 
rents was no longer necessary. The public rents succeeded in ensuring that private 
investments in learning were forthcoming and private pre-commitment ensured high 
levels of effort. The evidence from other sectors in India and Bangladesh suggests that 
capability development and growth has generally been slow in sectors that did not 
enjoy this combination of public co-financing of private learning. Clearly, the 
contracting failures affecting learning remain important. In these two sectors and a 
number of others, serendipitous combinations of public rents and private investments 
were sufficient to develop the organizational and technological capabilities necessary 
for achieving competitiveness. One challenge facing the construction of deliberate 
policy for other sectors is to calibrate the public support so that the ex post reward 
does not give too many free handouts to private investors who may have invested with 
lower incentives, but at the same time provide sufficient incentives for a successful 
outcome.  
 
Finally, some political and governance conditions were important in both cases, 
highlighting that every response to a contracting failure has specific enforcement and 
governance requirements. A common feature of both our cases was that for different 
reasons the top political leaderships were committed to the success of the particular 
project. This is likely to be a particularly important condition in developing countries 
where the overall governance environment is weak and success may depend on 
political leaders supporting particular projects. The political commitment may make 
more credible the monitoring and enforcement of critical contracts. In the Indian case 
the monitoring and enforcement of domestic content requirements was never doubted 
by Suzuki. In Bangladesh Daewoo and Desh were confident that back-to-back letters 
of credit and bonded warehouses would come through and that their specific profit-
sharing contract would be enforceable. These requirements are much less demanding 
than the expectation that some central agency will monitor performance and re-
allocate resources, but nonetheless they are governance requirements. The specific 
details of the financing instruments, political conditions and governance requirements 
in our two cases are obviously not directly replicable for other sectors or countries. 
Nevertheless, they suggest that in principle learning can be financed using instruments 
that generate incentives for effort that are credible even in political settlements where 
centralized industrial policy instruments are not likely to be effective.  
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